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Modern Western societies of high complexity rest on the operation 
of their subsystems — such as law, science, economy, public administ­
ration — on the basis of separate racionalities and on the development 
of the adaptability of these divergent subsystems to permanent change. 
Thus, while until the 19th century the stability of sociétés depended 
on the unchanging nature of their integral parts, the present stage of social 
development permits stabilization only if societies manage to co-ordinate 
the divergent changes of their subsystems.
In modern societies everything is contingent or, to use Niklas Luh- 
mann’s terms, “Everything is possible even in some other way.”
The structure of modern societies relies on laws effective until declared 
null and void, on a state policy that can be altered at the next elections, on 
scientific truths valid until refuted, and on families based on marriages in force 
until the divorce decree. Social respect for the legal code in operation has to 
be enforced while individual details of the law are practically subject to 
daily interpretation; identification with the priorities of state policy is to 
be ensured in the presence of alternative state policies taking the form of 
opposition programmes; and the stability of families is maintained through 
the possibility of divorce at any time.
Everything can be changed. And, in fact, there are changes all the 
time. These changes, however, often take place on the basis of considerati­
ons contradicting to each other. In the sphere of a country’s specific eco­
nomic rationality considerations of lucrativeness are determinative; in the 
realm of law the dual value judgement of lawful or unlawful works (where 
“lawful” always depends on the prevailing set of laws); while in the state- 
political domain, considerations of whether to stay in power as ruling party 
or to go into opposition orientate the changes. (Luhmann 1986.b.) How 
can such a society survive at all with no collapse ? How can a high-level 
complexity that rests on permanent changes be stabilized ? In this paper 
we are discussing only co-ordination among social subsystems and, for the 
sake of simplification, we regard integration problems and the mechanisms 
for overcoming them as solved.
Reflexions on the Co-ordination of Subsystems
German sociology has been treating the co-ordination problems of 
social subsystems with increasing interest for the past few years. One 
reason may lie in the deterioration of the role of the state as the integrator 
of society as evident, for instance, in the rapid gains made by liberal eco­
nomic policies as against earlier state interference according to the Keyne­
sian model. Within German sociology and political science distinct “speci­
alities” have developed which call for a critical examination of the preva­
lence of the judicature or the prevalence of the executive power of the state 
and cast a doubt from many aspects on the need that the state should have 
the function of governing society. (Voigt 1980. 1982.)
A markedly pessimistic view in regard to the possibility of the coor­
dination of social subsystems is represented by Claus Offe in a recent study. 
(Offe 1986.)
The coming into existence of modern societies speaks for the logics of 
individual social subsystems. Offe admits. In consequence the options that 
exist within the individual subsystem continuously call forth a lot of pos­
sible alternatives for action, and decisions are being made in the economy, 
in law, in public administration, etc. on a selective basis according to the 
rationality considerations of each subsystem. Offe sees the essence of mo­
dernity in this “openness for options”. The mechanisms of the distinct 
subsystems now institutionalize the permanent changes rather than the 
earlier rigid structures which permitted even slower changes in the life 
of society only through the obstacles of resistance. In other words, everyt­
hing changes, everything is changeable.
The latter is, of course, not Offe’s opinion, only of the optimists of 
modernization. Offe actually says that on the all-social level the new social 
structure is more rigid than it ever was. Its subsystems provide thousands 
of alternatives to society but the whole is unalterable. “Angesichts so mar­
kanter Beschränkungen der kollektiven Handlungskapazität drangt sich 
die Frage auf ob die Rede von der ““modernen”” Gesellschaft nicht eher 
ein illegitimer Euphemismus ist und wir stattdessen präziser von einer 
Gesellschaft sprechen würden, die zwar vielfältige Prozesse sektorales 
Optionsteigerung durchgemacht hat und nun infolgedessen über eine ta t­
sächlich moderne Verwaltung und Kunst, moderne Militär — und Erzi- 
chungswesen verfügt nicht aber als Gesellschaft über die Optionen, wie 
über dieses Ensemble von Teilmodernitäten und ihren Zusammenhang 
disponiert werden könnte” (Offe, 1986.)
Society as a whole is not only unchangeable but in fact even the co­
ordination of the modern details is becoming increasingly problematic. 
The permanent rapid changeability of the detail processes within individual 
subsystems inevitably influence the detail processes of other subsystems, 
and a society operating on the basis of subsystems that function indepen­
dently of each other and often according to conflicting musts, cannot bo 
expected to lead to the development of complementary institutions (within 
other subsystems) in order to deal with such effects (outside of the given
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subsystem) or possibly in order to neutralize them. Offe thinks that only 
chaos results from the all-social “integration” of social subsystems.
Something must be done, he says, lest this society coegulating into 
chaos from modern details should run away toward a modernization abyss 
that only raises increasing problems. We need to stop and reduce the number 
of options that develop within the individual subsystems and lessen the 
effects and needs that transcend the individual subsystem. This is the essen­
ce of Offe’s zero-option. The two main aspects of the zero-option are: 1. 
On the international level to get out as soon as possible grom the technolo­
gical race imposing a pressure of modernization on individual countries 
and to reduce interdependence. Thus, Offe calls for leaving the European 
Economic Community and cites the positive features, (i. e. only low un­
employment to date) of the manpower market in Austria, Sweden, Switzer­
land and Norway in evidence of the advantages deriving from non-participa­
tion in such an international merger. 2. On the national level as well a 
reduction of social interdependence is the task for reaching zero-option. 
Offe does not skirt the issue of cuts of benefits in the welfare state. “I t 
must not be ignored that in many cases the material, temporal and social 
self-limitation of the participants may lead to restricted performance and 
the need to curtail certain advantages of the welfare state.” (Offet 1986) 
This is, however, still a fair enough price to get rid of the unceasing pres­
sure for modernization.
Less pessimistic is Helmut Willke in regard to the all-social integration 
of the specific subsystems. (Willke 1978, 1979, 1983) Willke sets out from 
the integration problems of societies exclusively governed by the state. 
The faith without reservations in state interference, which characterized 
the practice of developed capitalist societies as well in the past 50 years or 
so, did not take seriously the impermeability that resulted from the auto­
nomous operation of the individual subsystems of a given society. As the 
state became the principal co-ordinator of the social subsystems, and, wor­
king out remedies for dealing with the stresses and tensions emerging in 
any one of them, resorted each time to direct interference, the applied 
therapy has actually given rise to an even larger number of serious disfunc­
tions, despite some occasional and partial successes.
Nonetheless, Willke thinks there are encouraging signs that promise 
the development of some kind of all-social integration. He regards the 
advance of the neocorporative institutional systems which has been noti­
ceable in the past decades as trends which may lead to all-social integration 
through the direct cooperation of the exponents of the rationality considera­
tions of the social subsystems instead of a centralized hierarchic coordina­
tion by the state. Let us examine Willke’s ideas more closely.
Willke shares the opinion that self-orientation of the individual social 
subsystems on the basis of their own rationality considerations create 
problems for the environment, i. e. for other social subsystems. Their ever 
more distinct separation renders the individual subsystems indifferent to­
ward the negative factors from the point of view of the environment if their
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decisions are optimal on the basis of their own rational considerations. Once 
a certain level of complexity has been reached, reciprocal indifference is 
becoming dangereous even for autonomous operation. Willke suggests 
that the subsystems should also make a thematic catalogue of the environ­
ment. In other words, their self-reflection should also include subsystems 
which constitute their environment and consequently they should give up 
some of their options, some of their alternatives for decision suggested by 
their own rational considerations, if the consequences were highly detri­
mental to the environment. In this way this mutual self-limitation of thesubsys- 
tems creates all-social integration. ,,Da aufgrund der hohen Variabilität 
und Spezialisierung jedes Teilsystem die Möglichkeit zur Überproduktion 
von Optionen hat, sobald es nur seine eigenen Kriterien, Interessen, Ziele 
und seine eigene Teilsystemrationalität maximiert, gleichzeitig aber jedes 
Subsystem bei einer Maximierungsstrategie der anderen Teile Gefahr liefe, 
seine relative Autonomie und funktionale Eigeaständigkeit zu verlieren, 
ist Koexistenz, Kompatibilität und Koordination nur möglich, wenn die 
jeweiligen Teile sich selbst beschränken, ihre Optionenvielfalt reduzieren 
indem sie schon mit Rücksicht auf die Möglichkeiten der anderen Tiele und 
des Ganzen formulieren.” (Willke, 1979, p. 230.)
Social integration by the state is unsuitable for this type of “reflexive 
self-limitation”. This “getting to know each other” by the subsystems and 
their consequent self-limitation find their institutional place in the neocor- 
porative bodies that are becoming recently observable. While the literature 
on neocorporatism describes the top interest groups, with all their activities 
and compromises as quasi political parties, Willke sees in them repre­
sentatives of the rationality considerations by individual social subsys­
tems trying to mediate diverging considerations of rationality rather than 
just different interests. (On traditional view in regard to neocorporative 
institutions see Alemann-Heinze 1979; von Alemann 1981.) Thus, hierar­
chic social integration by the state is replaced by a cooperative integra­
tion that is based on reflexive selflimitation — on the voluntary pru­
ning cut on rationality considerations. That is what Willke calls Entzau- 
berung des States (The Disenchantment of the State). Although there is no 
room in this study to discuss this in detail, we must note that this type of 
supra-state cooperative integration is supplemented by the development 
of ideas for a new type of legal system as expounded by the German 
law sociologist Günther Teubner, who was in close cooperation with 
Willke. He replaces the instrumental law of hierarchic state control with 
“reflexive” law which conveys all-social cooperative integration. (Teubner 
1982, 1986; Teubner-Willke 1984). Compared to instrumental law which 
conveys the material provisions and prohibitions of the state governing 
society toward the individual social subsystems, reflexive law would 
set only procedural rules for the centres of decision within the various 
social subsystems, while the effective regulation within the individual 
subsystems would be elaborated largely by the local centres of self-govern­
ment. Apart from prescribing procedural rules and guarantees, reflexive 
law tries to outline an organizational framework for correctng the ine-
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qualities among the participants in the decisions within the individual 
subsystems.
On the basis of Willke’s “Disenchanted State” and Teubner’s “ref­
lexive law”, a general thesis could be arrived at, according to which, if a 
system reaches a certain degree of complexity, because some of its internal 
elements become autonomous and split into further subsystems, it can no 
longer be controlled from a single point and such central direction causes 
a larger number of more serious disfunctions than it attempts to remedy. 
Any further increase of complexity in such systems is possible only if the 
selfgovernment of their internal subsystems is developed and these centres 
of self-government become linked in a cooperative framework. Thus, the 
hierarchic system is transformed into a cooperative one. Examining tech­
nological systems of high complexity, the Hungarian Tibor Vámos arrived 
at similar results in 1983 (see Vámos 1983, 1986.)
From the late 1970s on, Niklas Luhmann has adapted for sociology 
the concept of “autopoiezis”, which gained ground earlier in general 
systems theory, and in recent years he has treated the autopoietic segre­
gation of the social subsystems and their internal cycles. (On the most 
comprehensive level of “sociality” where “society” as the level of given sys­
tem is just one along with other social systems, that is the interacting 
and organizational systems — Luhmann included the idea of autopoiezis 
already in a comprehensive work of his. Luhmann 1984.)
I t was Humberto Maturana, a Chilean biologist, who worked out the 
autopoiezis concept by the early 1970s. Maturana set out with the rejection 
of functionalism because in his judgement it is external observation that 
vests the coordination of the internal processes of living organisms with 
functionalism. The individual nerve cells, the individual organisms get 
reproduced through elements deriving from their internal structures and 
although more comprehensive biological systems utilize them as building 
blocks for their own structural development, the individual elements — 
systems in themselves — change basically through their internal structure. 
This comprehensive system utilizes its subsystems as the carriers and pro­
ducers of definite attributes accroding to its own structure. But the subsys­
tems, despite this type of reduced utilization, have not become organized 
in order to ensure these attributes — although the external observer who 
examines the more comprehensive biological systems may conclude this 
while observing the regular “cooperation” of the parts — but perform 
their cyclic reproduction as determined by their internal structures. 
To take Maturana’s thesis ad absurdum, it is not the whole which deter­
mines the parts; the parts determine themselves and the constellation 
of their attributes accidentally produced, makes possible the develop­
ment and cyclic reproduction of a more comprehensive whole.
The individual subsystems are by far more autonomous than this has 
been supposed by biological functionalism, and there is no hierarchic in­
terrelationship between the individual subsystems, although the external 
observer as a “Kommandozentrale” notes the activity of the given parts 
governing the rest.
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The final conclusion of Maturana’s autopoietic system is the undersco­
ring of the autonomy and selfdetermination of the components of complex 
systems. The reproduction of these component systems is autopoetically 
closed; the more comprehensive system is unable to determine the internal 
processes of its components, the effects of the more comprehensive system 
reach the micro processes through the filter of the inner structure of the 
component system. The autopoietic system creates the new elements in the 
course of its reproduction with the help of elready existing elements and 
also with the help of the structure that takes shape through the arrange­
ment of the new elements in a cyclic process.
Here we wanted to indicate only the main trends of Luhmann’s flun­
king in this brief outline of his ideas on the autopoietic enclosure of the 
economy as a component system. (Luhmann 1983, 1984 b.) When he worked 
out the autopoezis of the economy, Luhmann concentrated on the recon­
struction of the basic cyclic process of this system. Presupposing an ideal 
market economy, he found this in the process of “Zahlung” (payments). In a 
pure market economy any payment makes possible other payments or the 
possible absence of some payment renders impossible other payments and 
the purchase of anything includes giving up the purchase of something else. 
In this way any economic act has a “double effect”, “I purchase this and 
thereby decide not to purchase something else.” The linking up of payments 
to other payments ensures a tight control of the system, making possible 
for the individual economic units the calculability of future actions of the 
others.
In other words, the market economy is an unbroken process of pay­
ments regulated by prices. Prices open the internal cycle of the economy 
toward the environment and do this on the basis of demand. To be sure, 
Luhmann, although in his new concept he strongly emphasized the closed 
nature of the social subsystems as a result of their finctional separation 
in the course of social revolution, makes ob the ot her hand several attempts 
to deal with this closed nature. The closed economy opens up through 
orientation toward demand; shifts in demand are transmitted by prices 
and in this way prices also introduce changes taking place in the environ­
ment into the process of payments, rendering some payments impossible 
but, under normal economic conditions, ensuring on the whole the conti­
nuation of the cycle of payments.
In this way the economy becomes insensitive to any outside circum­
stance, any economically relevant action is motivated only by the terms of 
payment, oriented on the prices. The closed economy, being insensitive to 
external motivations, becomes, however, as the prices are based on demand, 
hypersensitive in one aspect. It takes an especially intensive cognizance of 
the slightest shift in demand or of events to result in such a shift, though an 
established signalling system (capital, security markets, merchandizing 
and other mechanisms) and responds to these stimuli by transforming its 
internal structure. “The more closed, the more open”, this is how we could 
label Luhmann’s ideas on autopoiezis. Confinement on each side and hyper­
sensitivity in one aspects — this just about summarizes Luhmann’s thinking.
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How does the all-social coordination of autopoietically closed social 
subsystems take place ? As we saw, Offe predicted an all-social chaos pre­
vailing over the component systems, whereas Willke found a solution in 
the neocorporative institutional systems (“Yerhandlungssysteme”) reali­
zing the cooperation among social subsystems rather than in hierarchic 
social integration by the state. Luhmann cautiously set himself apart from 
the idea of “reflexive” law which was also remote from Willke’s concept 
on the guidance of society (Luhmann 1985), although he certainly does not 
share Offe’s pessimism in regard to all-social chaos. The fact is that social 
subsystems become hypersensitive in some aspects after their separation, 
or, symbolically speaking, “stick out antennae” into the social environ­
ment, thus becoming aware of any changes in the social environment for­
med by the other subsystems. They govern themselves the harmony with 
the environment and thus in the final analysis the coordination of the social 
subsystems operating according to divergent considerations of rationality 
comes about through spontaneous rearrangement.
Thus, Luhmann is not at all sceptical in regard to the possibility of 
all-social coordination. The situation is, however, different if society as a 
whole has to react on its envrironment beyond society. A spontaneous rearran­
gement of the separated subsystems proves to be insufficient this time, 
yet there is no other way of response by a “differentiated” society, though 
it would be imperative to react upon dangers threatening with the upset 
of the biological and ecological balance, upon problems of genetic techno­
logy and some other questions. Luhmann, however, indicates that despite 
these dangers no satisfactory solution is possible, in other words, he is 
completely pessimistic in regard to ecological problems (Lumhann 1986).
Macrosocial Innovation Chains Suggest a Possibility We think that the 
mechanism described by Willke and Luhmann are not the only possible 
mechanisms in operation for the all-social coordination of distinct social 
subsystems. (We may regard Offe’s concentration on „partial modernities” 
as one sided although it stresses some important problems.) I t should be 
mentioned here that when putting forward our own ideas we rely first of all 
on Luhmann’s papers in the 1960s and 1970s and make an attempt at 
reconstructing the process in which changes in the social subsystems 
were arranged into macrosocial innovation chains. (Cf. my earlier study, 
Pokol, 1985) Right in the beginning there is a difference from the original 
Luhmannian thesis in our approach to how to apply the paradigm of system 
environment to social subsystems. In his recent papers Luhmann insists 
that after the development of the functional and structural autonomy of a 
given social subsystem, all the other social subsystems become degraded 
into environment , in other words, each of the others constitutes a uniformly 
neutral environment for the given subsystem. On the other hand, we think 
that the development of such an autonomy means only the closing down 
of the microprocesses toward the rationality considerations of other sub­
systems, i. e. of the environment, while between the social subsystems — 
each of which is closed toward the others on the level of the microprocesses 
— there remain bilateral relations, in fact, as we shall see, entire chains
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between the social subsystems that have become closed toward the others. 
In other words, all the other remaining subsystems do not provide a uni­
formly neutral environment for any given social subsystem, for each shows 
greater sensitivity toward one specific social subsystem. To suggest an 
example, the legal sphere is more sensitive toward political programmes 
— especially toward a new government programme — than toward changes 
in the domain of art; the curricula of universities are more sensitive to 
changes in the given branch of science than to changes in the party prog­
rammes. Thus, when Luhmann — even in his recent papers — argues that 
the development of autopoetic confinement is tantamount to the closing 
down and becoming indifferent of a given system on all sides, while beco­
ming hypersensitive in a certain aspect, our interpretation is that sensi­
tivity in any given aspect intensifies links toward the output of a given 
social subsystem.
In this reinterpretation of the paradigm of the system/environment 
on the level of social subsystems, not only bilateral link-ups are evident 
among social subsystems but also chain-like links among a number of sub­
systems. The individual social subsystems in these chains gain the material 
for changing their functional “material” (technologies, theses and norms 
etc.) largely from the different subsystem and do so through selective trans- 
formation.
If we have in mind today’s Western European societies, we can re­
construct the changes in their major social subsystems by examining two 
macrosocial innovation chains. Public administration, law, the state and 
government, the party system, the ideological sphere and the sphere of the 
arts and social sciences become coordinated in a long innovation chain and 
the economic sphere is linked, partly detached from this, in a short inno­
vation chain with the consumption pattern of a given society and on the 
other side, with the technological sphere and the natural sciences. To the 
long innovation chain the changes are transmitted initially by the periodi­
cal parliamentary elections (head of state etc.) which occur in response to 
the alterations in certain social subsystems that have been induced from 
within each; and to the short innovation chain of the economy the changes 
are induced through the changes in the market.
To sketch a model, within the long innovation chain the parliamentary 
and other elections within the state system set off innovation waves in 
two directions whenever there is a radical change in the government party 
after the election returns. With a radical change in the governing patry, 
the state and political sphere is renewed and subsequent to this the new 
government and the new majority in parliament replaces the parts of the 
effective law that are contrary to the new political priorities. I t is through 
altering the law that renewal reaches the subsystem of publie administra­
tion which then after some reluctance and some reinterpretations reshapes 
its operation as reprogrammed by the new legal provisions and intervenes 
in the various social subsystems with new therapies for reducing and sol­
ving the social tensions that triggered off the change in government.
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The parliamentary elections that bring a radical change in the gover­
ning party set off waves of renewal in another direction as well. Defeat in 
the election for new state bodies is interpreted by the former government 
party and each party that suffered heavy losses at the polls as a challenge 
for self-examination and renewal. The party politicians and ideologists in 
these suddenly minority parties are prompted in most cases to bring about 
through internal party elections a renewal of the given party -  its leaders 
and programme. Thus, as the modern state received its build-in innovation 
mechanism through elections (see Luhmann 1965, 1972), so the modern 
political parties built on internal party elections. Of course, the renewal 
of the parties is also possible without a parliamentary defeat but the general 
rule is that only such a setback will really compel the parties to make more 
radical changes. Of course, there will always be parties which survive 
astonishingly heavy losses of votes, but it involves the danger of their 
being simply ousted from the political scene and becoming a small marginal 
“sect” in possession of a very low percentage of the votes. Changes in the 
party political sphere send off ripples toward the ideological sphere as 
well.
Although in recent decades it is no longer only the political parties 
which are the guardians — shapers and reshapers — of a given ideology/ 
(with their party press, schools and pamphlets) as it was the case during 
the first decades of this century, the role of the parties is still strong in 
regard to ideologies. The renewal of any party provides a stimulus to alter 
the ideological tenets conveyed to the masses, the ideological apparatus 
of a renewed party utters, tones down or stresses certain ideological theses 
(arguments, contexts and notions). Ob the other hand, this ideological 
renewal opens up the given ideology for the arguments, interrelationships 
and findings accumulated in the newer branches of the social sciences. 
Some of the thousands of scientific assertions and arguments conflicting 
with each other, will be transformed into ideological theses — that is if 
they are suitable for the defens of a given ideology or some of its positions 
and for the refutal of opposing ideologies. This, of course, involves a pe­
culiar metamorphosis: new stresses develop, there is no longer any scientific 
validity to exist until refutal, and the new thesis becomes “the truth” as 
conveyed by ardnet ideologists. The same kind of selective reception and 
transformed utilization is characteristic of the process of the transformation 
of the ideological theses into party programmes and the conversion of 
government programmes into legal rules (we are not thinking here of the 
cases when this programme automatically becomes Inn-), and the transfor­
mation of legal norm into administrative practice.
To sum up, it is possible to reconstruct an innovation chain between 
the above mentioned social subsystems where the waves of renewal are 
set off by the renewal of the state and government sphere and provide im­
pulses for a change in two ways. The periodical parliamentary and other 
state elections invest the innovation processes with a cyclic character. Fol­
lowing this, if the therapy applied by the new government party was un­
successful, there is an additional change in government subsequent to
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another election. In this case the new party programmes which promise 
success are provided (tanks to the feedback) by the renewal of the losing 
party. This macrosocial innovation chain is like a model and has been sket­
ched as an ideal type: actually, of course, the western societies also expe­
rience a thousand and one hitches and explosive changes. Nonetheless, this 
chain arrangement through the changes of the social subsystems may have 
been instrumental in the fact that they have been able to preserve in rela­
tive stability and without any explosion their highly complex structure 
built on continuous change, for more than forty years since World War II.
To come back to Willke’s concept of “self-limitation”, we think that 
for the individual social subsystems the major aspiration should be not so 
much to reduce their alternatives for action when they have come to know 
the rationality considerations of the other subsystems, but to ensure that 
the subsequent selection of the alternatives, dccison mechanisms and opti­
ons worked out in the chains of social subsystems should work well. (Of 
course the reduction of options may also be important for the coordination 
of social subsystems.) Such mechanisms are still functioning. Any social 
subsystem that has established its autonomy develops its own internal 
mechanisms for selection which render it insensitive to some of the options 
flowing in from the subsystems linked to it and screen these options while 
they admit some of them through transformed reception and thus alter 
their own internal structure and their own internal priority systems.
The problem is constituted by the fact that in the case of such link­
ups one social subsystem is able to limit the autonomy of another one to 
such an extent that the introduction of the new priorities may actually 
occur without selection and transformation. This is the situation, for in­
stance, in the case of instrumentalized law, that is, when political priorities 
are concerted into legal provisions without regard to the internal logic of 
the legal sphere.
What we have said so far apply to developed western societies. Since 
they have attained a certain degree of complexity, the East European 
socialist societies have shown some similar problems in their efforts for all­
social coordination. In them the social-guidance role of the state has become 
stronger than in w'estern countries, thus a phase of further development 
may bring increased tensions also in this respect. I t constitutes, however, 
a more serious and more actual problem that the autonomous rationality 
of the individual social subsystems had a very one-sided development. 
Concentrating on accelerated industrialization, Stalinist modernization 
broke the autonomous mechanisms of law, science, economy, art and pro­
fessional public administration during the years of early socialism.
For us here in Eastern Europe the task is to reinstitutionalize the 
separate rationality considerations of the individual social subsystems and 
to transform direct state and government interference into guidance thro­
ugh law. Beyond a certain degree of complexity, however, it will become 
the order of the day to rethink the need for the centralized guidance of 
society — however democratic that state guidance is.
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ВОЗНИКАЮ Щ ИЕ ПРОБЛЕМ Ы  
ПОДУСТРОЙСТВ КОМ ЛЕКСНЫХ ОБЩЕЩЕСТВ
БАЛА ПОКОЛ
Автор исходит с того, что некоторы современны подустройства западных 
обществ (права, наука, и с с к у с т в о , экономика, государственное управление и т д ...)  
все более будут функционально отделяться друг-от друга и действия в нутри подуст­
ройств ориентированы самостоятельными оценочными точками зрения.
Паралельно с этим отделением, отделением структуры подустройств современ­
ных обществ станут всё более переменяемым: законодательства м о г у т  быть аннули­
рованы и заменены с новыми; государственная политика может быть заменена 
в парламентарных выборах; истины науки станут перманентно опровержимым; 
современная мелькая семья обоснована на законном браке смениться разводом 
и заключением нового брака.
Всё они будут всё более переменяемы, но перемены будут управлены в отдель­
ных общественных подустройствах отличающими оценочным точками зрения.
Как согласуются такие отличающие перемены на уровне всего общества ? 
— Очерк обозревает теоретические ответы немецкой социологии по проблеме) во 
первых ответа Никласа Лумана, Гельмута Уильке, Гюнтера Тайбнера и Клауса 
Оффэ), излагает собственную гипотезу также.
Её сущность предположение иннвационных рядов макросоциального уровня 
между общественными подустройствами.
PROBLEME DER KOORDINATION DER SUBSYSTEME DER KOMPLEXEN 
GESELLSCHAFTEN
BfiLA  POKOL
Der Ausgangspunkt des Verfassers ist die Ausdifferenzierungen der einzelnen gesell­
schaftlichen Subsysteme in den modernen westlichen Gesellschaften. Im  Laufe dieser Aus- 
diiferenzierungen koppeln die Institu tionen  der W irtschaft, der Wissenschaft, des Rechts, 
der politischen Bereichs sich voneinander ab, und innerhalb der einzelnen Subsysteme sind 
die Handlungen und Tätigkeiten durch autonom en W ertgesichtspunkten orientiert. Parallel 
zu dieser Ausdifferenzierungen werden die S truk turen  der Subsysteme moderner Gesell­
schaften immer m ehr veränderbar: die R echtsvorschriften können ausser K raft gesetzt und 
durch parlam entarischen W alilen ausgetauscht werden: die wissenschaftlichen W ahrheiten 
werden perm anent widerlegbar: die auf Ehe gegründete moderne Familie kann durch E he­
scheidung und  durch neue Eheschliessung konsolidiert verändert werden. Im m er m ehr 
kann  alles in der modernen Gesellschaft verändert werden, aber diese Veränderungen inner­
halb der einzelnen gesellschaftlichen Subsysteme sind durch verschiedene W ortgesichtspunk­
te  orientiert. Wie können die divergierenden Veränderungen in gesamtgesellschaftlichen 
Ebene koordiniert werden'/ Die Studie analysiert die wichtigsten A ntw orten zu diesem Prob­
lem, die in er neueren deutschen Soziologie aufgefunden werden können. In  erster Linie 
beschäftigt die Studie sich m it der A ntw ort von Niklas Luhm ann, H elm ut Willke, G ünther 
Teubner und Claus Olle, ln  der zweiten Teil der Studie skizziert der Verfasser seine eigene 
theoretische H ypothese zu der Lörung der Koordinationsprobleme der komplexen westlichen 
Gesellschaften. Im  K ern dieser Hypothese stehen die makrogesellschaltlichen Innovations­
zusammenhänge zwischen der einzelnen Subsysteme.
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